By its first question, the referring court asks the Court, in essence, to rule on whether divorces in which no decision creating or altering rights has been issued by a public authority – be it a court or other organ of the State – fall within the substantive scope of Regulation No .<\/p>\n
To my mind, however, there is a genuine interest in having the Court give an answer to the question raised, inasmuch as this will ensure, in accordance with the case-law cited above, ( 58 ) that the concept of \u2018divorce’ within the meaning of Regulation No is uniquely interpreted and, therefore, uniformly applied in the legal orders of all of the participating Member States. In this instance, if the Court answers that question in the negative, as I shall recommend, the German authorities will, in particular, be compelled to adapt the rules of national law accordingly, as the German Government acknowledged at the hearing.<\/p>\n
The issue of whether such private dissolutions are covered by that regulation is raised, in the present case, in relation to an Islam-based – Syrian – legal system which allows the bonds of marriage to be dissolved by an act of intent drawn up by the husband which is then simply registered or made the subject of a purely declaratory decision issued by a religious authority. That issue arises more generally, however, in relation to divorces of all existing types which are obtained without the participation of a public authority acting in a capacity involving the creation or alteration of rights, whether they arise from a manifestation of unilateral or joint intent by the parties.<\/p>\n